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Of Farm Animals and Justice
Steven M. Wise*
I. Introduction
The average American consumes over six hundred pounds
of animal flesh and animal products a year, and in doing so
ingests about twice the amount of protein needed for health.'
Over one hundred farm animals are slaughtered each second
in the United States in the service of that appetite. In total,
over three billion chickens, pigs, ducks, cows and calves, rab-
bits, sheep, turkeys and goats, an annual number equal to
two-thirds of the entire human population of the world are
slaughtered.2 Millions more animals are confined in dairy
herds and used for the production of milk or crowded into
great flocks and used for egg production or meat. Most farm
animals live out their lives in places that little resemble a
traditional farm, but in a kind of factory, where they stand
crowded on artificial ground and see only the light and feel
only the warmth of artificial suns. Their bodies are often mu-
tilated by the farmer and bear wounds inflicted by other ani-
mals whose aggression is spawned by the conditions in which
they all live. Their instincts are frustrated.3 "Solitary" they
* President of Fraser & Wise, P.C., 896 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.; B.S., Wil-
liam & Mary, J.D. Boston Univ. Member of the Massachusetts Bar. The author also
serves as President of the Animal Legal Defense Fund.
1. J. Mason & P.Singer, Animal Factories 113 (1980); P. Singer, Animal Libera-
tion, A New Ethic For Our Treatment of Animals 171-201 (1975).
2. See M. Fox, Returning to Eden: Animal Rights and Human Responsibility 86
(1980); D. Giehl, Vegetaranism: Way of Life 116 (1979); Galvin, What Rights For
Animals? A Modest Proposal, 2 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 245, 245 (1985).
3. Council for Agric. Science & Tech., Rep. No. 91, Scientific Aspects of the Wel-
fare of Food Animals (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CAST Report].
The commercial broiler industry has led in application of efficient production
methods such as high density housing, control of housing environment, bulk
feed delivery and mechanical feeding, use of fat and antibiotics in feed, and
least cost feed formulation. Many of these progressive practices have been
1
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are not, but otherwise theirs is the true Hobbesian life, "poor,
nasty, brutish, and short."4 In addition, farm animals are now
subject to advanced techniques of genetic engineering in order
applied to production of turkeys, hogs, and beef cattle, or are being applied.
Miller & Hodges, One Man Feeds 5,000 Cattle Or 60,000 Broilers, in Contours of
Change: The 1970 Yearbook of Agriculture 58 (1970).
For detailed descriptions of factory-farming see, Curtis, We Are What We Eat:
Factory Farming, in Animal Rights - Stories of People Who Defend the Rights of
Animals 73-89 (1980); M. Fox, supra note 2, at 86-104; Harrison, Ethical Questions
Concerning Modern Livestock Farming, in Animals' Rights - A Symposium 122-30
(D. Paterson & R. Ryder eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Harrison, Ethical Ques-
tions]; Harrison, On Factory Farming, in Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry Into
the Maltreatment of Non-Humans 11-24 (S. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch & J. Harris
eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Harrison, On Factory Farming]; Mason, Brave New
Farm?, in In Defense of Animals 89-107 (P. Singer ed. 1985); Note, The Rights of
Nonhuman Animals and World Public Order: A Global Assessment, 28 N.Y.L. Sch.
L. Rev. 377, 389-91 (1983); Comment, Factory Farming: An Imminent Clash Be-
tween Animal Rights Activists and Agribusiness, 7 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 423, 425-
34 (1979). See generally Agric. Comm., First Rep., H.C., No. 406-I, Animal Welfare in
Poultry, Pig and Veal Calf Product (1981) [hereinafter cited as House of Commons];
M. Fox, Husbandry, Behavior, and Veterinary Practice (1984); Factory Farming: A
Symposium (J.R. Bellerby ed. 1970); Magel, Factory Farming 1951-1980, in A Bibli-
ography of Animal Rights and Related Material (1980); J. Mason & P. Singer, supra
note 1.
Ruth Harrison aptly summed up the system:
The factory farmer aims at a maximum turnover of capital with a mini-
mum of effort, his main criterion being immediate profitability. He uses new
systems - developed first and foremost for his own convenience - which sub-
ject the animals to conditions to which they are not adapted, systems ...
'characterized by extreme restriction of freedom, enforced uniformity of ex-
perience, the submission of life processes to automatic controlling devices
and inflexible time-scheduling.. . and running through all this the rigid and
violent supression of the natural.' Many of these farmers are not really farm-
ers at all but business interests running their farms from their offices by re-
mote control.
Harrison, Animals in Factory Farming, in Animals and Their Legal Rights 69 (E.
Leavitt 3d ed. 1978) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as Harrison, Animals].
4. W. Frankena, Ethics 97 (1963) (quoting T. Hobbs from Levithan).
Detachment and unnecessary brutality seem to be universal components
of intensive animal husbandry, presumably because they help to distance the
farmer from the mass suffering and slaughter for which he is either directly
or indirectly responsible. The process is also encouraged by the advent of
modern farming methods .... At this level of detachment, the animal easily
becomes a mere cipher, a unit of production, abstracted out of existence in
the pursuit of higher yields.
J. Serpell, In The Company of Animals 155 (1986).
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for them to better serve human beings.'
On the factory-farm, individual animals are frequently
seen as unimportant; their interests and concerns are subordi-
nated to those of the herd or flock and ultimately to those of
man." Profitability is the star by which the animals' lives are
steered.7 Their billions bear tragic witness to what occurs
when human beings disregard the dignity of sentient beings
and exploit them for economic or political ends.8
Before the general use of antibiotics in their feed and
water, farm animals were raised in small groups, as large
5. Off. of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Rep. No. OTA-F-285, Technology, Pub-
lic Policy and The Changing Structure of American Agriculture, 4-6, 31-39, 205-07
(1986) [hereinafter cited as Changing Structure of American Agriculture].
6. "Feeding systems for broilers, for example, now require the services of only
one man to care for 60,000 to 75,000 birds. A man can feed upwards of 5,000 head of
cattle in a modern feedlot." Miller & Hodges, supra note 3, at 57. See also Jensen,
The Science and Husbandry of Swine Management, in Animal Agriculture: The Bi-
ology of Domestic Animals and Their Use by Man 579 (H. Cole & M. Ronning eds.
1974) ("[h]istorically, they [pigs] have been recognized as 'mortgage lifters' ).
Profits in agriculture are not made by setting up conditions in which
each individual animal is maximally productive, or even maximally
healthy. . . . The possiblity of a split between the conditions which are com-
mercially best for the farmer and those which favour the health of the indi-
vidual animal becomes greater the more animals comprise the total unit. The
smaller the proportion of the profit that is represented by one animal, the
less that animal in an economic sense, matters .... Within this vast efficient
industry, one animal is a very small cog. For this reason, the productivity of
modern farming says very little about the welfare of the individual animal. It
says little about its physical health, let alone its mental welfare.
M. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, The Science of Animal Welfare 29-32 (1980) (empha-
sis in original). See also M. Fox, supra note 2, at 137-43.
It is the position of the agricultural community "that 'the goal of maximum prof-
itability pursued by animal producers [and others] leads automatically to improved
welfare of both animals and humans'." M. Fox, supra note 3, at 218 (emphasis
added).
Both the conditions of factory-farming and its economic rationalizations recall
the 'tight-packers' of the slave ships of the 'Middle Passage'. See D. Mannix & M.
Crowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1518-1865 at 105-06
(1962).
7. P. Singer, supra note 1, at 98.
8. The plights of factory-farmed animals recall immense historical infringements
on the moral rights and interests of helpless and subdued human beings at a time
when they, too, were submerged within a vast and uncaring system that saw them
beyond the scope of moral concern and civil protection. See generally N. Levin, The
Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry, 1933-1945 (1968); D. Mannix & M.
Crowley, supra note 6.
19861
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groups encouraged outbreaks of serious disease. With the ad-
vent of the regular administration of antibiotics to farm ani-
mals, the size of flocks increased ten-fold, the herds on the
feed lots a hundred-fold. It was the use of antibiotics "that
rendered such mass production of livestock practicable and
economically sound."' 0 But even factory-farming has not
brought forth production sufficient to satisfy the meat and
poultry producers. Farm animals are now being subjected to
advance biotechnologies." These include embryo transfers
(through which the embryo can be sexed, split, frozen, and
even fused with embryos of other animal species to produce
chimeric animals),12 recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid
(rDNA) techniques (that allow the injection of growth hor-
mone into animals and will allow future animals to be perma-
nently endowed with the genetic traits of human beings, other
animals, and even plants),"3 and "artificial embryonation"
(whereby embryos can be placed into the uteri of animals
whose estrous cycles have been artificially regulated). 4
The act of concentrating farm animals in a way that fails
to respect their ethological needs, or telos,"s causes them to
suffer mental and physiological stresses and renders them
weak and further susceptible to disease. " This mandates the
9. White-Stevens, Antibiotics Curb Diseases in Livestock, Boost Growth, in
That We May Eat, The 1975 Yearbook of Agriculture 93 (1975).
10. Id. at 93-94.
11. See Changing Structure of American Agriculture, supra note 5, at 31-39.
12. Id. at 32, 36. One researcher has predicted the development of cattle weigh-
ing more than ten thousand pounds and pigs twelve feet long and five feet wide. Fox,
Genetic Engineering: Nature's Cornucopia of Pandora's Box, The Animal's Agenda
Mar. 1987 at 10. Dr. Fox has termed such as an example of "biological fascism." Id. at
12.
13. See Changing Structure of American Agriculture, supra note 5, at 33-35.
14. Id. at 37-38.
15. When an animal is alive, "it has what Aristotle called a telos, a nature, a
function, a set of activities intrinsic to it, evolutionarily determined and genetically
imprinted.... Furthermore, its life consists precisely in a struggle to perform these
functions, to actualize this nature, to fulfill these needs, to maintain this life ... " B.
Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality 39 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Coop. Extension Serv., Univ. of Mass., Rep. No. 106, Raising Veal
Calves 4 (S. Gaunt & R. Harrington eds. 1975). "The health of the veal calf can best
be described as anemic, weak and susceptible to disease." Id.
In the view of one critic of factory-farming: The primary evil of factory-farming
[Vol. 3
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incessant administration of subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics
that apply an evolutionary pressure to normal antibiotic-sus-
ceptible bacteria and cause them to evolve into antibiotic-re-
sistant strains that can ultimately pose a health threat to the
human beings who consume their flesh.17 The products of fac-
tory-farming have been criticized as a threat to the health and
welfare of the human beings who eat them.18 Biotechnology
is that its methods
are pathogenic, as a consequence of immunosuppressive psychosocial stress
[which may be exacerbated further by the synergistic effects of agrichemical
contaminants of animals' feed, notably by pesticides, many of which are now
known to be immunosuppressive]. This phenomenological correlation be-
tween emotional distress, stress, and disease resistance has been extensively
investigated under controlled laboratory conditions and may well prove to be
as relevant to the health and welfare of domesticated animals as to our own
health and well-being also.
M. Fox, supra note 3, at 218 (citations omitted).
It has been found that a nonhuman animal's lack of control over a noxious envi-
ronment alone lowers his or her body's immunological responses. Laudenslager, Cop-
ing and Immunosuppression: Inescapable But Not Escapable Shock Suppresses
Lymphocyte Proliferation, 221 Science 568 (1983). Cf. Kaplan, Manuck, Clarkson,
Lusso, Taub & Miller, Social Stresses and Atherosclerosis in Normocloesterolemic
Monkeys, 220 Science 733 (1983) in which the variable of social stresses alone corre-
lated with the development of atherosclerosis in cynnomolgus monkeys.
17. Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp.
278, 286 n.5 (D. Mass. 1986); Changing Structure of Animal Agriculture, supra note 5,
at 206; 0. Schell, Modern Meat, Antibiotics, Hormones and the Pharmacoutical Farm
3-180 (1984); Holmberg, Osterholm, Senger & Cohen, Drug-Resistant Salmonella
From Animals Fed Antimicrobials, 311 New Eng. J. Med. 617 (1984); Holmberg,
Wells & Cohen, Animal-to-Man Transmissions of Antimicrobial-Resistant
Salmonelle: Investigations of U.S. Outbreaks, 1971-1983, 221 Science 833 (1984);
Levy, Playing Antibiotic Pool: Time to Tally the Score, 311 New Eng. J. Med. 663
(1984).
18. "To himself, the meat-eater seems to be eating life. To the vegetarian, he
seems to be eating death." M. Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter 27 (1983).
The deglutition of farm animals and their products have been implicated in a wide
variety of serious human diseases. The consumption of meat alone has been labeled,
after the uses of tobaco and alcohol, "the greatest single cause of mortality in the
United States." Note, supra note 3, at 377, 389-90. It is a contributing cause to heart
disease, several forms of cancer, kidney disorders, salmonellosis, osteoporosis, and
trichinosis. See D. Giehl, supra note 2, at 23-42; J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note 1,
at 117-19; Arntzenius, Kromhout, Barth, Reiber, Bruschke, Buis, van Gent, Kempen-
voogd, Strikwerda & van der Velde, Diet, Lipoproteins, and the Progression of Coro-
nary Atherosclerosis, 312 New Eng. J. Med. 805 (1985); Lipkin & Newmark, Effect of
Added Dietary Calcium On Colonic Epithelial-Cell Proliferation In Subjects at
High Risk For Familial Colon Cancer, 313 New Eng. J. Med. 1381 (1985); Ross, The
1986]
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threatens the essence of the animals themselves.
In this article, the unjust state of present law as it con-
cerns farm animals and the homocentricity that underlies it is
examined and criticized. Some of the erroneous ways in which
society thinks about farm animals, indeed animals in general,
the ways in which the law drives this thinking, and the ways
in which this thinking drives the law, are discussed. Inte-
grated are proposals that would encourage the protection of
the health and welfare of farm animals. Other proposals
would encourage public awareness of the conditions under
which farm animals live and die, of the waste, pollution, and
inefficiency that is factory-farming's twin, and of the harmful
effects of factory-farming upon the health of human beings.
The hope is that presentation of the facts will permit an in-
formed public to decide whether the factory-farming system is
just, whether it wishes to support the factory-farm system by
purchasing its products, or even whether it should call for its
reform or abolition. Finally, the proposals would discourage
factory-farming and the use of biotechnology that reduces the
animal to an object, and encourage the return to and renewed
growth of a humane and caring system of farm animal
husbandry.
Pathogenesis of Atherosclerosis - An Update, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 488 (1986);
Tornberg, Holm, Carstensen & Eklund, Risks of Cancer of the Colon and Rectum in
Relation to Serum Cholesterol and Beta-lipoprotein, 315 New Eng. J. Med. 1629
(1986). Willett & MacMahon, Diet and Cancer - An Overview, 310 New Eng. J. Med.
698-701 (1984).
The commercial implications of the recognition of this health problem by the
nation's consumers have not escaped the notice of the United States Dep't of Agricul-
ture. "Vegetarian diets are becoming common in many countries, including the devel-
oped countries. Such diets demonstrate how health concerns have altered consump-
tion patterns - the red meats, eggs, and diary products are examples of recent losses
due to health concerns." Mathia & Deaton, Why People Eat What They Eat Around
the World, in United States Agriculture in a Global Economy, The 1985 Yearbook of
Agriculture 49 (1985). However, this has been denied.
Exogenous cholesterol intake from animal fats was first thought to be respon-
sible for the genesis of atherosclerosis, but this theory has proved errone-
ous. . . . It would not seem logical to blame the comsumption of animal fats
for the increased incidence of atherosclerosis during recent years. Nor would
it seem desirable to advise consumers to avoid animal products that contain
fats.
C. Lasley, The Science of Animals That Serve Mankind 57-58 (1975).
[Vol. 3
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II. Inadequacies of Present Law
A. Background
It is difficult to place nonhuman animals in their proper
perspective.' 9 Three fundamental, sometimes contradictory,
mistakes in our thought about them are often made. First, we
assume that they possess insufficient mind. By doing so, we
neglect a lesson of biological evolution, that "the difference in
mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, cer-
tainly is one of degree and not of kind. '20 Indeed, "Itihe
Western world has yet to make its peace with Darwin and im-
plications of evolutionary theory."'" This matter of "differ-
ence" has tended historically to be a crucial component in
human willingness to ignore the interests of other beings,
human and otherwise, or to pretend that their interests do not
exist. It was an oft-cited tenet of human slavery.2 2 In fact,
19. Perhaps it is more correct to say that it is difficult to place human animals in
their proper perspective. Compare M. Midgley, Beasts and Man: The Roots of
Human Nature (1980) (which sets forth the biological fact that "[wie are not just
rather like animals; we are animals") with M. Fox, The Case for Animal Experimen-
tation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective (1986) (which states that "the issue
of humans place in nature is far from being resolved and never will be. Is Homo
Sapiens an animal or more than an animal?").
20. C. Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, ch. IV
(1891).
21. Gould, A Matter of Degree, in Ever Since Darwin, Reflections in Natural
History 50 (1977).
22.
The strangeness and seeming savagery of the Africans, reinforced by tradi-
tional attitudes and the context of early contact, 'were major components in
the sense of difference which provided the mental margin absolutely prereq-
uisite for placing the European on the deck of the slave ship and the Negro
in the hold.'
0. Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, A Comparative Study 7 (1982) (quoting W.
Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 at 97
(1969) (emphasis in original). European and American whites struggled to demon-
strate that the two races were separate species, as if once that border was crossed,
further justification was unnecessary. Gould, American Polygeny and Craniometry
before Darwin, Blacks and Indians as Separate, Inferior Species, in The Mismeasure
of Man 30-72 (1981); Nott, Two Lectures on the Natural History of the Causcasian
and Negro Races, in The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum
South, 1830-1860 at 212 (D. Faust ed. 1981). In the introduction to his book, Judge A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr. stated that he intended to "document the vacillation of the
courts, the state legislatures, and even honest public servants in trying to decide
7
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"[t]he legal position of animals is not unlike that of human
slaves at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the
United States. Slaves had no legal rights of their own, yet
were afforded some special legal protection."23
Second, we overly credit animals with the ability to en-
gage in "moral thinking." We rationalize our consumption of
them by confusing biology with ethics and looking to a non-
moral nature to teach us the moral lesson that since nonhu-
man animals eat each other, we may eat them.2 ' However,
many farm animals are themselves natural vegetarians. More
importantly, a farm animal is not a moral agent, defined as
"an individual who can be held morally accountable for the
whether blacks were people, and if so, whether they were species apart from white
humans, the difference justifying separate and different treatment." A. Leon Higgin-
botham, Jr., In The Matter of Color, Race & The American Legal Process: The Colo-
nial Period 7 (1980). "Not surprisingly, modern livestock producers are generally un-
willing to consider the welfare of their animals because this would entail thinking
about them as subjects rather than objects. As persons rather than things, and this
would raise imponderable questions about the morality of their treatment." J.
Serpell, supra note 4, at 155.
23. D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law 2 (1983).
24. Gould, Nonmoral Nature, in Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes, Further Reflec-
tions in Natural History 32-45 (1983). This error was repeated in a recent Office of
Technology Assessment report to the United States Congress.
Consistency suggests rights should be ascribed to animals once rights are
given to infants and mentally handicapped humans who also lack discretion.
Yet it would be inconsistent to assert that humans are not superior to ani-
mals while suggesting that humans should refuse to exploit other species,
even though other species exploit each other.
Off. of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Rep. No. OTA-BA-273, Alternatives to Animal
Use in Research, Testing, and Education 83 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives
to Animal Use]. Similar appeals to nature were made to justify slavery. Nott, supra
note 22, at 238. There Nott quoted from Alexander Pope:
All Nature is but Art, unknown to see;
All chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
All Discord, Harmony not understood;
All partial Evil, universal Good.
And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
One truth is clear, WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT.
Stephen Clark asserts that animals are not moral as "they do not, as far as we
can see, have any occasion to moralize about themselves or to construct intellectual
systems to accomodate their immediate responses." However, he contends they are
ethical in that "they respond to aspects of a situation and to features of their kin-
dred, that a good man also would respect." S. Clark, The Nature of the Beast: Are
Animals Moral? 107 (1982).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss2/3
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acts he performs or fails to perform, one who can rightly be
blamed or praised, criticized or condemned."25 Animals can be
held no more accountable for their actions than can human
infants, young children, senile elders, or profoundly retarded
or insane human beings.26 We who seek to emulate their
moral development may find ourselves engaged in one of the
astounding array of actions that enliven the animal world,
such as sexual cannibalism.27 Such mimicry casts aside our
humanity and "contradicts and cancels the one single advan-
tage that our race has received from what is called evolution,
namely the development of a sense of right and wrong." 28
Third, animals are viewed as incompletely evolved beings,
lower than we on an evolutionary ladder. This essentially pre-
Darwinian concept of organic evolution is a powerful echo of
what the historian Arthur Lovejoy labeled as "one of the half-
dozen most potent and persistent presuppositions in Western
thought," the so called "Great Chain of Being." 9 This imagi-
nary ladder of life, consisting "of an ordered series of beings,
from the lowest, simplest, and tiniest at the bottom to the
highest and most complex at the top"30 embodies the idea
25. T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 86 (1983).
26. Id. at 53.
27. Buskirk, Frohlich & Ross, The Natural Selection of Sexual Cannibalism,
123 American Naturalist 617 (1984).
28. S. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals 154 (1977) (quoting J. Powys, Autobi-
ography 638 (1967). But Rhesus monkeys have consistently suffered hunger, some-
times for more than a week, rather than secure food at the expense of electrically
shocking a conspecific. Wechkin, Masserman & Terris, Shock to a Conspecific as an
Aversive Stimulus, 1 Psychonomic Sci. 47, 47-48 (1964); Masserman, Wechkin & Ter-
ris, Altruistic Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys, 121 Am. J. Psychiatry 584, 584-85
(1964). It is unclear whether this behavior involves moral thinking. Compare the al-
truistic behavior of the Rhesus monkeys to that of the human subjects in Stanley
Milgram's famous experiment. See Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal
Psychology 371, 371-78 (1963).
It certainly fails to explain how day old male chicks can be thrown into plastic
bags to suffocate under the weight of the others cast atop them, simply because they
serve no human economic interest alive. News & Analysis, Egg Producers Issue
Guidelines for Destroying Baby Chicks, 4 Int'l J. Study of Animal Problems 14, 14-15
(Jan.-Mar. 1983); J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note 1, at 3-5.
29. A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being VIII (1936), quoted in Gould, Bound
by the Great Chain, in The Flamingo's Smile 281 (1985).
30. D. Boorstin, The Discoverers, A History of Man's Search to Know His World
and Himself 457-58 (1983).
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that organic evolution implies inevitable progress. Yet Dar-
winian evolution does not imply progress. It implies nothing
but the operation of natural selection upon variation. 1 The
popular link of organic evolution with progress "remains a pri-
mary component of our global arrogance, our belief in domin-
ion over, rather than fellowship with, more than a million
other species that inhabit our planet. '3 2 To this extent our
efforts to understand man's place in nature continue to be as
"dominated, perverted, and obstructed," s today no less than
in the time before Darwin.
Increasingly many argue that animals have moral rights
and are not merely means to human ends.34 If they have
31. Gould, Chance Riches, in Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes: Further Reflections
in Natural History 332-42 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Gould, Chance Riches]; Gould,
Darwin's Untimely Burial, in Ever Since Darwin 39-45 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Gould, Untimely Burial]; Gould, Darwin's Dilemma: The Odyssey of Evolution, in
Ever Since Darwin 34-38 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gould, Darwin's Dilemma].
32. Gould, Darwin's Dilemma, supra note 31, at 38.
33. D. Boorstin, supra note 30, at 457.
34. They have urged teleological justifications, where the rightness of an act de-
pends only on its consequences. J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion, ch. XVII, § 1 (1789); Gruzalski, The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals
for Food, in Ethics and Animals 251 (H. Miller & W. Williams eds. 1983); P. Singer,
supra note 1, at 1-26; Singer, The Fable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals, 88
Ethics 122 (Jan. 1978). See also L.W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory 199
(1981), drawing on the utilitarian analysis of Singer to conclude that the characteris-
tic of sentience requires us not only to grant moral rights to fetuses who have aquired
sentience, but "requires that we become vegetarians (at least as long as intensive
farming practices persist)." Id.
They have urged deontological justifications, where the rightness of an act does
not depend only on its consequences to support the concept of the moral rights of
animals. Brophy, The Darwinist's Dilemma, in Animal Rights: A Symposium 63-72
(1979); Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms: An Examination of a Changing Ethic 1 (un-
dated); S. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (1984); Feinberg, Human Duties and
Animal Rights, in On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics 45-69 (R.K.
Morris & M.W. Fox eds. 1978); M. Fox, supra note 2, at 152-72; Godlovitch, Animals
and Morals, in Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry Into The Maltreatment of
Non-Humans 156-72 (S. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch & J. Harris eds. 1971); S.
Godlovitch, Utilities, in Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry Into The Maltreat-
ment of Non-humans 173-90 (S. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch & J. Harris eds. 1971);
Nelson, Duties to Animals, in Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry Into The Mal-
treatment of Non-humans 149-55 (S. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch & J. Harris eds.
1971); Rachels, Do Animals have a Right to Liberty?, in Animal Rights and Human
Obligations 205-23 (T. Regan & P. Singer eds. 1976); T. Regan, supra note 25, at 331-
98; B. Rollin, supra note 15, at 46-53; Rowan & Tannenbaum, Animal Rights, 66
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss2/3
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moral rights, is it just to act as if they do not and also to deny
them legal rights? Certainly the biological and moral charac-
teristics that we ascribe to animals and the way in which we
perceive animals have everything to do with the answer. Our
understanding of who animals are has a powerful impact upon
our sense of ideal justice. This sense of justice plays a power-
ful, and possibly determinative role, in how the law ultimately
comes to treat animals.35
National Forum 30 (1986); H.S. Salt, Animal's Rights: Considered in Relation to So-
cial Progress (1980). See also B. Brody, Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A
Philosophical View 107-08, 155-56 n.11 (1975), where it is argued that if possession of
a brain that has not suffered cessation of function is the essential prerequiste of a
human being then "this raises, of course, a fundamental problem about the rights of
animals, especially their right to life." Id. See also H. Beston, The Outermost House
19-20 (1971):
We patronize them [animals] for their incompleteness, for their tragic fate of
having taken form so far below ourselves. And therein we err and greatly err.
For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more
complete than ours, they move finished and complete, gifted with extensions
of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices we shall never
hear. They are not brethren; they are not underlings; they are other nations
caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the
splendor and travail of the earth.
Animals have sometimes been tried for their alleged transgressions against hu-
manity. Beach, Beasts Before the Bar, in Ants, Indians, and Little Dinosaurs 53
(1950); G. Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods: A History of Cruelty and Kindness to
Animals 27-35 (1972).
In Western Europe procedure against animals was settled, both in the eccle-
siastical and civil courts; in all cases they were provided with counsel, were
duly summoned to appear, exceptions taken in their favor were considered,
and their sentences sometimes commuted on the ground of relative youth,
exiguity of body, or reputation for respectability.
Dox, Beasts at the Bar, 4 Lincoln L. Rev. 1, (1931). For further review of the trials
and tribulations of alleged animal transgressors see E.P. Evans, The Criminal Prose-
cution and Capital Punishment of Animals (1906); Hyde, The Prosecution and Pun-
ishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64
U. Pa. L. Rev. 696, 696-730 (1916).
The English system of deodand, whereby personal chattels, inanimate or animal,
that caused the death of a human being were forfeit, was a possible twist of this view
of life. Id. at 726-30.
35. Rehbinder, Questions of the Legal Scholar Concerning the So-Called Sense
of Justice, in Law, Biology & Culture: The Evolution of Law 35-41 (M. Gruter & P.
Bohannan eds. 1983). Our sense of justice as a segment of "one's ethical, as well as
one's ontolgical framework is determined by what entities one is prepared to notice or
take seriously." S. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals 7 (1984).
The arguments for basic human rights, as freedom from torture, are frequently
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It has been more than three hundred years since Rene
Descartes proclaimed that nonhuman animals were mere
mechanical automata, unfeeling machines.3 But Voltaire's re-
sponse to Descartes remains unanswered: "You discover in
him (an animal) all the same organs of feeling as in yourself.
Answer me, mechanist, has Nature arranged all the springs of
feeling in this animal to the end that he may not feel? 37 Sci-
ence has taught us that animals, certainly those whom we fac-
tory-farm, have such well-developed nervous systems that the
question is not whether they feel and suffer, but how much. 8
justified on the noncomparative ground (a human being's right to receive certain
treatment is absolute and exists simply because he or she is a human being and is not
relative to whether other human beings receive it) that because "all persons in fact
have certain capacities - e.g., to reason or to feel pain - and [they] therefore should be
treated alike." Simons, Equality As a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 387, 455
(1985). It is justified as well on the comparative ground (a human being's right to
receive certain treatment is purely relative to whether other human beings receive it)
"that persons should be treated with equal dignity or desert, with the consequences
that rights should be universally distributed." Id. (emphasis in original). Such
noncomparative rights follow from the facts of the animals' biology, while
"[clomparative rights can be liberal or conservative, utilitarian or based on fairness,
general or specific, and so on." Id. at 480. The arguments that animals should receive
certain basic rights can follow similar paths. On one hand, there exist noncomparative
grounds for granting animals those rights that respect their physiologies. On the
other hand, there exist comparative grounds for granting animals rights because
human beings possess them and animals should be treated with equal respect; it is
not claimed that animals should be able to vote or have freedom of religion and it is
equally clear that human beings generally deserve a greater number of rights than do
non-human animals. Therefore the comparative rights to which human beings and
animals are entitled are proportionality rights, in that both are entitled to be treated
proportionately to their morally relevant differences. See id. at 434-46. Professor
Simons uses the term "rights" in "a very broad and generic sense, as referring to 'all
claims that can justly be made by or on behalf of an individual or group.., to some
condition or power.'" Id. at 446-47 n.131.
36. Regan, Introduction to Animal Rights and Human Obligations at 4 (T. Re-
gan & P. Singer eds. 1976).
37. Voltaire, A Reply to Descartes, in Animal Rights and Human Obligations 68
(T. Regan & P. Singer eds. 1976). For a more comprehensive rebuttal by a philoso-
pher see T. Regan, supra note 25, at 9-33. For that of an animal physiologist and
bahaviorist see generally D. Griffin, Animal Thinking (1984) and D. Griffin, The
Question of Animal Awareness (1981). See also M. Midgley, Animals and Why They
Matter 134-43 (1984).
38. Focus, The Problem of Pain: What Do Animals Really Feel?, 3 Int'l J. Stud.
Animal Problems 275 (Oct. - Dec. 1982). See also Fraser & Fox, The Effect of Ethos-
tasis on Farm Animals Behavior: A Theoretical Overview, 4 Int'l J. Stud. Animal
Problems 59 (Jan.-Mar. 1983); P. Singer, supra note 1, at 10-16. See generally M.
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Is it not true that "[ilf a being suffers there can be no moral
justification for refusing to take that suffering into considera-
tion?" 39 Yet the law that regulates human behavior towards
farm animals remains essentially grounded upon a Cartesian
ethology and a pre-Darwinian biology.
Farm animals presently have no legal rights, for as will be
discussed, they generally have no standing to litigate, their in-
terests are usually not considered, and they have no remedy
for their harm.40 But they should not be barred from consider-
ation as candidates for holding rights. "Each time there is a
new movement to confer rights onto some new 'entity,' the
proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable.
This is partly because until the rightless object receives its
rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of
'us' - those who are holding rights at the time."'41
Because farm animals suffer in great numbers, they make
out a prima facie case both for moral and legal rights. While
the possession of moral rights is not a absolute legal prerequi-
site to the possession of legal rights42 the acknowledgement of
Dawkins, Animal Suffering, The Science of Animal Welfare (1980).
Similar concerns have been expressed in anti-abortion literature.
Do the unborn also experience pain? In a society with strong humanitarian
instincts this question has a special weight and deserves special considera-
tion....
The problem of knowing whether an animal, a baby, or an unborn child
can suffer is basically the same. We cannot experience anyone else's pain. We
know it only by empathy. We must be led to identify enough with the other
to feel the pain.... With animals who do not scream and with the unborn,
we must interpret other signs, such as wriggling, and by the context in which
the sign occurs infer that pain is present....
In each case in which we empathize we assume the presence of the physi-
cal organs necessary to apprehend pain.
J. Noonan, Jr., A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies 158-59 (1979).
39. P. Singer, supra note 1, at 9.
40. Dichter, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and Animal Rights, 7 B.C. Envtl. Aff.
L. Rev. 147, 147-48 (1979); Galvin, supra note 2, at 245. See also, Stone, Should
Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev.
450, 458-59 (1972).
41. Stone, supra note 40, at 455 (citations omitted).
42. House of Commons, supra note 3, at 9 ("[S]ociety has a duty to decide upon
certain standards in respect to its treatment of animals. We maintain that this can be
done without relying on philosophical arguments about animal rights or the nature of
animal suffering.").
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the one is an undeniable aid in the attainment by a living be-
ing of the other. Animals should not be required to wait for
the final resolution of the question before they are protected
by civil law. 43
B. Anti-cruelty Laws
The interests of American farm animals are protected by
little more than general state anti-cruelty statutes,4" most of
which were passed before 1871, the year of the publication of
Darwin's The Descent of Man. Virtually all the rest followed
before the implications of that work were well understood.4 5 It
43. Stone, On the Moral and Legal Rights of Nature, Bostonia, July-Aug. 1983,
at 29, 33.
In the area of morals, the dominant misconception is to suppose that all
arguments of the form 'X ought to have a legal right' have to be grounded on
a demonstration that 'X has a moral right'. Some legal rights do, indeed,
seem to secure historically antecedent liberties. But there is no necessary
connection. Corporations, for example, are accorded all sorts of legal, even
constitutional rights, a practice that does not commit to the view that corpo-
rations are metaphysical persons, much less moral agents. We may feel that a
legal regime in which corporations are accorded the rights of natural persons
is preferable to one in which they are not.
Id. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Stone, supra note 40, at 450.
44. Leavitt & Halverson, The Evolution of Anti-Cruelty Laws in the United
States, in Animals and Their Legal Rights: A Survey of American Laws from 1641-
1978 at 11-32 (3d ed. 1978); Dichter, supra note 40, at 151-52 & 156- 60; Friend,
Animal Cruelty Laws: The Case for Reform, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201 (1974); Comment,
Towards Legal Rights for Animals, 4 Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 205, 212-16 & 224-27 (1974);
Comment, supra note 3, at 436-46; Annot. 82 A.L.R.2d 794 (1962).
45. Leavitt & Halverson, supra note 44, at 13-14.
The earliest such law was placed in the "Body of Liberties" of Massachuetts Bay
Colony in 1641, which stated that "[nlo man shall exercise any Tirranny or Cruelite
towards any brutie Creature which are usuallie kept for man's use." Id. at 11. Anti-
cruelty laws were not universally seen as products of the inevitable turn of the wheel
of civilization. William Harper, a United States Senator, state appeals court judge
and chancellor, wrote "[wiho but a driveling fanatic, has thought of the necessity of
protecting domestic animals from the cruelty of their owners? And yet, are not great
and wanton cruelties practised on these animals?" Harper, Memoir on Slavery, in
The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830-1860, at
98 (D. Faust ed. 1981). See also G. Carson, Man Beasts, and Gods, A History of
Cruelty and Kindness to Animals 49 (1972).
In 1809 the Scottish Lord Thomas Erskine, then lord chancellor, presented a
bill to prevent malicious and wanton cruelty to a quite restricted list of do-
mestic animals, the horse, ox, sheep and pig. Though the proposal was nar-
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is therefore not surprising that these early statutes were
chiefly codifications of the indirect duty view of human re-
sponsibility toward animals. That is "the proposition that we
have no duty directly to animals; rather, animals are a sort of
medium through which we may either succeed or fail to dis-
charge those direct duties we owe to nonanimals, either our-
selves, other human beings, or, as on some views, God.' 46
State anti-cruelty statutes were in place long before the
post World War II advents of factory-farming and genetic en-
gineering. 47 Although today every state has its anti-cruelty
row in scope, the dome of the rotunda of the House of Lords rang with wails
and caterwauls, mewings and cock crowings.
Id.
46. T. Regan, supra note 25, at 150. See, e.g., Knox v. Massachusetts Soc'y for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 407, 409, 425 N.E.2d 393,
396 (1981) ("These [anti-cruelty] statutes are 'directed against acts which may be
thought to dull humanitarian feelings and to corrupt morals of those who observe or
who have knowledge of those acts.' Commonwealth v. Higgins, 277 Mass. 191, 194
(1931)."). A hundred years earlier the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated
that these statutes defined an offense not against the "rights of animals that are in a
sense protected by it. The offence is against the public morals, which the commission
of cruel and barbarous acts tend to corrupt." Commonwealth v. Turner, 145 Mass.
296, 300, 14 N.E. 130, 131-132 (1877). Even that rare court that has spoken in terms
of animal "rights" usually returned to the indirect duty view. See, e.g., Stephens v.
State, 65 Miss. 329, 3-4 So. 458 (1887).
To disregard the rights and feelings of equals, is unjust and ungenerous, but
to wilfully or wantonly injure or oppress the weak and helpless, is mean and
cowardly. Human beings have at least some of the means of protecting them-
selves against the inhumanity of man, - that inhumanity which "makes
countless thousands mourn," but dumb brutes have none. Cruelty to them
manifests a vicious and degraded nature, and it tends inevitably to cruelty to
men. Animals whose lives are devoted to our use and pleasure, and which are
capable, perhaps, of feeling as great physical pain or pleasure as ourselves,
deserve, for these considerations alone, kindly treatment. The domination of
men over them, if not a moral trust, has a better significance than the devel-
opment of malignant passions and cruel instincts. Often their beauty, gentle-
ness and fidelity suggest the reflection that it may have been one of the pur-
poses of their creation and subordination to enlarge the sympathies and
expand the better feelings of our race. But, however this may be, human be-
ings should be kind and just to dumb brutes, if for no other reason than to
learn how to be kind and just to each other.
Id. at 331-32, 3-4 So. at 459.
French law viewed this requirement technically, according to one writer, as it
"punishes cruelty to animals only if it occurs in public so as to scandalize human
observes." G. Carson, supra note 45, at 16 (citations omitted).
47. Leavitt & Halverson, supra note 44, at 13-14.
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statute, "an analysis of this body of legislation demonstrates
that these statutes provide virtually no real protection for the
modern farm animal."4 The statutes are frequently drafted in
exceedingly general terms. For instance, the word "animal" is
"generally construed ... to include any living creature other
than man unless a contrary legislative intent is suggested,"' 9 a
definition so broad that one court simply narrowed the mean-
ing to exclude fowl.5 0 In order to be deemed "cruel ", an act
must usually be "unjustifiable", "unnecessary", or be per-
formed "cruelly", "wantonly", "maliciously", "intentionally",
"needlessly" or "knowingly", and cause purely physical suffer-
ing.51 They frequently address cruelty problems typical of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overloading,
overdriving or overworking of work animals.52 Anti-cruelty
statutes did not envision the necessity of the protection of
farm animals living on the factory-farm and subject to sophis-
ticated biotechnological processes whose sole object is to in-
crease food efficiency."
The enforcement of these criminal statutes is typically
left to a public prosectorial agency, itself overwhelmed by
human problems, or to an overburdened private SPCA or sim-
ilar society, with no private enforcement right provided."
48. See Comment, supra note 3, at 437.
"Although society's attitudes towards animals have been evolving, only occasion-
ally have statutes been redrafted. The result is that most of the statutes are old and
full of archaic phrases. The statutes often appear to overlap, and many terms used
are redundant or undefined." D. Favre & M. Loring, supra note 23, at 121.
49. Friend, supra note 44, at 204 (citations omitted).
50. See State v. Buford, 65 N.M. 51, 331 P.2d 1110 (1958).
51. See Alternatives to Animal Use, supra note 24, at 306-09; Leavitt & Halver-
son, supra note 44, at 21-27; Friend, supra note 44, at 207-08; Comment, supra note
3, at 438-42.
52. See D. Favre & M. Loring, supra note 23, at 124; Leavitt & Halverson, supra
note 44, at 21-22.
53. See Changing Structure of American Agriculture, supra note 5, at 10, 31, 38-
39, 75-85. Other than a comment that two groups have charged in lawsuits that ge-
netic engineering of farm animals is immoral and unethical, the Office of Technology
Assessment Report ignores the impact of this biotechnology on the welfare of the
animals.
54. See Comment, supra note 3, at 443-46. See also Comment, Creating 4 Pri-
vate Case of Action Against Abusive Animals Research, 134 U. Penn. L. Rev. 399,
419-21 (1986) (discussing the difficulty of using anti-cruelty stautes to protect abuses
[Vol. 3
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Fines are low and the maximum terms of imprisonment are
short.5 5 Considering the billions of animals involved and their
diversity of species, the regulation of the treatment of factory-
farmed animals by general state anti-cruelty statutes reveals a
lack of concern with the interests and needs of farm animals
that is without legal analogue in the world of human regula-
tion." It is as if all human health, sanitary, and criminal codes
simply permitted any and all acts against or involving other
human beings, except "malicious" acts that were "cruel" or
"unnecessary".57 Anti-cruelty statutes generally provide so lit-
tle protection to farm animals that in reality there is no dis-
tinction between those states which do and those that do not
exclude farm animals from their anti-cruelty statutes. 5"
In our relationship with farm animals, "individual human
need and desire [are treated] as the ultimate frame of refer-
ence" with the underlying assumption being that the "human
goals and ends must be taken as externally 'given' . . . rather
than generated by reason."" e This frame of reference has an-
in animal experimental laboratories).
55. Leavitt & Halverson, supra note 44, at 28-32.
56. The criminal process is obviously unfit to deal with the scope of the problem.
For example, in Massachusetts the anti-cruelty statute metes out punishment less
than that given to despoilers of graveyard shrubery. Compare Mass. Gen. Law Ann.
ch. 272, § 73 (West Supp. 1986) (which sets a maximum penalty of five years in state
prision or a five thousand dollar fine, or both, for being one who "willfully destroys,
mutilates, removes, cuts, breaks, or injuries a tree, shrub, or plant" placed within a
cemetary lot) with Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 272, § 77 (West Supp. 1986) (which
identifies the maximum penalty of one year, five hundred dollar fine, or both, for
conviction of violating the anti-cruelty statute).
57. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2918 (1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. xi, § 1325 (1974); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 828.12 (West 1976); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 578.055 (Vernon 1970); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. xxi, § 685 (West 1965); Wash. Rev. Code § 16.52.070 (1974); W. Va. Code
§ 61-8-19 (1984).
58. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2918 (1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. xi, § 1325 (1974); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 828.12 (West 1976); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 37-711-1109 (1976); Iowa Code
Ann. § 717.2 (West 1979); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.102-102.1 (West 1986); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. xxviiA, § 510 (1983); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 578.055, 578.060 (Vernon 1976);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28.1002 (1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:8 (1974); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14:360 (1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. xxi, § 685 (West 1965); xviii Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 5511 (Purdon 1983); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.11 (1974); Utah Code Ann.
§ 79-9-301 (1978); Wash. Rev. Code § 16.52.070 (1974); W. Va. Code § 61-8-19 (1984).
59. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Envi-
ronmental Law, 83 Yale L. J. 1315, 1326 (1974). This attitude was vividly portrayed
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cient philosophical and religious foundations whose bedrock is
that human beings are godlike, hold absolute dominion over
nonhuman animals, and are the ends of all means.eo But,
in a recent animal husbandry text. "[Lliving animals are used for milk, wool, draft,
transportation, protection, sport, work, and pleasure. When slaughtered, they supply
meat and byproducts ranging from glue to medicine, confectionary to fertilizer, catgut
to chemicals. Few other raw products have such versatility." J. Blakely & D. Bade,
The Science of Animal Husbandry 2 (4th ed. 1985) (emphasis added).
Modern farming views farm animals and plants as agricultural units whose pro-
duction efficency is subject to constant improvement. See Changing Structure of
American Agriculture, supra note 5, at 31. "Such Knowledge and skills [biotechnol-
ogy] will give scientists much greater control over biological systems, leading to sig-
nificant improvements in the production of plants and animals." Id. at 12.
60. The King James version of the Old Testament says that God gave Adam and
Eve "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every
other living thing that moveth upon the earth,"(Genesis 1:28) and told Noah that
"[e]very moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you" (Genesis 9:3). But see Eccle-
siastes 3:19-21.
For that which befalleth the sons of man befalleth beasts; even one thing
befalleth them; as one dieth, so dieth the other; Yea, they have all on breath;
so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all is vanity. All unto
one place; all are of dust, and all turn to dust again.
Id. The word "dominion" was also chosen by the court in State v. Mann to character-
ize the relationship of master to slave as it turned back an attempt to hold a master
responsible for the "cruel and unreasonable battery" of a female slave, and noted that
the power of the master was "conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law
of God." State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 266 (1829).
"The Bible [also] served as the core of (the proslavery mainstream) defense."
Faust, Introduction to The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebel-
lum South 1830-1860 at 10 (D. Faust ed. 1981). See e.g., Stringfellow, A Brief Exami-
nation of Scripture Testimony on the Institution of Slavery, in The Ideology of
Slavery, Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830-1860 at 136-67 (D. Faust
ed. 1981). It is ironic that
[firom an evolutionary point of view, religions are based on emotions that are
nourished by reactions and impulses derived from phylogenetically older
parts of the brain. Ethics, beliefs, morality, the qualities that make us
human, and all values we cherish, are strongly influenced by the regions that
already existed in the reptile brain millions of years ago.
Gruter, Biologically Based Behaviorial Research and the Facts of Law, in Law, Biol-
ogy, and Culture: The Evolution of Law 4 (M. Gruter & P. Bohannon eds. 1983).
Aristotle held that animals, like slaves, were articles of property, and that ani-
mals existed for the sake of man. Aristotle, Animals and Slavery, in Animal Rights
and Human Obligations 109-10 (T. Regan & P. Singer eds. 1976); Comment, supra
note 44, at 20.
Aquinas taught that "[aiccording to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and
plants is preserved not for themselves but for man." Aquinas, On Killing Living
Things and the Duty to Love Irrational Creatures, in Animal Rights and Human
Obligations 119 (T. Regan & P. Singer eds. 1976).
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"[s]urely this is an infantilism which is unendurable.., a res-
idue from a past of inconsequence when a few puny men cried
of their supremacy to an unhearing and uncaring world."6 It
is unnecessary for human beings to treat farm animals as they
do, and because it is unnecessary and because the animals suf-
fer, it is unjust.
The legislatures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were correct in their belief that cruelty to animals hardens the
heart of mankind.6 2 But legislatures err in believing that when
they narrow the positive law that codifies this moral precept,
as when they exclude farm animals or animals raised under
factory-farming conditions from its reach, they modify the
moral precept. Part of the Congressional purpose of the Fed-
eral Animal Welfare Act" was "the humane ethic that ani-
mals should be accorded the basic creature comforts of ade-
quate housing, ample food and water, reasonable handling,
decent sanitation, sufficient ventilation, shelter from extreme
weather and temperature, and adequate veterinary
care. . ... '64 Yet, "farm animals, such as, but not limited to
The Devil "was frequently identified with or associated with animals (including
pigs, bulls, geese, sheep, and horses), sometimes following earlier Judeo-Christian tra-
dition and sometimes because the animals were sacred to pagan gods, whom Chris-
tians identified with demons." J. Russell, Lucifer: The Devil In The Middle Ages 67
(1984). But,
the Devil could never be a lamb, because Christ is the lamb of God; the Devil
was never an ox and seldom (in spite of its logical appropriateness) an ass,
because the ox and ass were supposed to have been in the manger and the ass
also bore Jesus into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday.
Id. at 67 n.10.
Pope Pius IX (reigned 1846-1878) refused a request by the Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to open a branch in Rome as it was his view that
man owed no duties to the lower animals. E.S. Turner, All Heaven in a Rage 163
(1964). But see C. Hume, The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion 27 (1980).
61. McHarg, Values, Process and Form, in The Fitness of Man's Environment
213-14 (1968); Stone, supra note 40, at 493.
62. Stone, supra note 40, at 455.
63. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (Supp. III 1985).
64. H.R. Rep. No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5103, 5104. See also the pronouncements that the Animal Welfare
Act was a "statutory mandate that small helpless creatures deserve the care and pro-
tection of a strong and enlightened public" and reflected "the philosophy of caring
for animals enunciated by W.D. Hoard in 1885, who said: The stupid brutishness of
men who are too ignorant of their own interests to be gentle and humane finds, at
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livestock or poultry" are excluded from the statutory defini-
tion of "animal", 65 as if they were not "animals" and did not
also require adequate housing, ample food and water, reasona-
ble handling, decent sanitation, sufficent ventilation, shelter,
and veterinary care.
Direct federal regulation of farm animals consists only of
two statutes. The older statute is the Twenty-Eight Hour
Law, 66 which provides that animals cannot be transported
without being unloaded for at least five hours of rest, water-
ing, and feeding.6 7 No differentiation of need among species is
made. There is little ethological justification for any animal
having to endure such confinement and deprivation for as
long as twenty-eight hours without relief. The time consumed
in loading and unloading the animals is not counted. 8 Sheep
are not required to be unloaded at night and so may stand
loaded for up to thirty-six hours, as may other animals upon
the grant of a written request.6 9 The penalty for violation is
small and must be recovered in a civil action filed by the
United States Attorney. 70 The statute arguably does not apply
to transportation by truck as it was passed in 1873.71
The newer statute is the Humane Slaughter Act .7 Its
purpose was to require that livestock slaughter "be carried out
only by humane methods", to prevent "needless suffering".1 3
It requires all animals to be "rendered insensible to pain by a
single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical, or other
means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled,
hoisted, thrown, cast or cut".7 " However, it contains an impor-
last, sharp punishment, for God, ever just to the least of his creatures, denies such
men profit or prosperity and thereat all good men say 'Amen!' ". Id.
65. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1982).
66. 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1982).
67. Id. § 71.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. §§ 73-74.
71. D. Favre & M. Loring, supra note 23, at 151.
72. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1982).
73. Id. § 1901.
74. Id. § 1902(a).
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tant exemption "for reasons of freedom of religion".7' It de-
fines Kosher slaughter as "humane". 76 This definition is valid
despite the controversy over, (1) whether, as a matter of biol-
ogy, not religion, the manner in which pure Kosher slaughter
is carried out is, in fact, humane, and (2) whether, when Ko-
sher slaughter is carried out in conjunction with United States
Department of Agriculture regulations that forbid placing an
animal on the ground," it is humane." The statute has been
upheld against the claim that it amounted to an establish-
ment of religion in violation of the first amendment. 79
European countries currently lead in regulating factory-
farming. English concern over the conditions of factory-farm-
ing began to rise shortly after the publication of Animal Ma-
chines8" in 1964. A governmental Technical Committee was
appointed "to examine the conditions in which livestock are
kept under systems of intensive husbandry and to advise
whether standards ought to be set in the interests of their
welfare, and if so what they should be."81 This "Brambell
Committee" investigated, advised and set detailed standards
for chickens, turkeys, cattle, pigs, sheep, and rabbits. How-
ever, many of these standards were diluted or not adopted.
None were given the force of law, though some were made
75. Id. § 1906.
76. Id. § 1902(b).
77. Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 19"t4), aff'd mem. 419
U.S. 806 (1975).
78. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1292-94. For discussions of the humaneness of Kosher
slaughter see News & Analysis, Jewish Ritual Slaughter May Ignore Animals' Wel-
fare, 3 Int'l J. Stud. Animal Problems 92 (1982); P. Singer supra note 1, at 152-57.
For an example of a system that would replace shackling and hoisting see A Pilot
Study of a Small Animal Restrainer for Ritual Slaughter, 7 The Vealer 28 (June
1985).
In The Slaughter of Food Animals by The Royal Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, it is stated that animals slaughtered according to Jewish
(Shechita) and Moslem (Halal) traditions take from seventeen seconds to six minutes
to lose consciousness. See RSPCA Urges Immediate Slaughter Reform, 82 Agscene 6
(Mar. 1986). In 1985, the British Government's Farm Animal Welfare Council also
criticized religious sluaghter methods. See U.K. Review on Religious Slaughter, 5 An-
imals International 7 (Winter 1985).
79. Jones, 374 F. Supp. at 1284.
80. R. Harrison, Animal Machines (1964).
81. House of Commons, supra note 3, at 5.
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part of a Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Food Code of
Recommendations .0 2
Concerning the problem of confinement itself, the
Brambell Committee set forth the "Five Freedoms" of
movement:
In principal we disapprove of a degree of confinement of
an animal which necessarily frustrates most of the major
activites which make up its natural behavior. . .. An
animal should at least have sufficient freedom of move-
ment to be able without difficulty to turn around, groom
itself, get up, lie down, stretch its limbs."3
A West German appellate court has ruled that keeping
layer hens in battery cages violates the German Animal Pro-
tection Act of 1972, as the practice fails to take the natural
behavior of the hens into account.8 4 When it takes full effect,
a Swiss law will halt many practices that have come to be as-
sociated with factory-farming.8 5 Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
and Luxembourg have laws that prohibit one or more of these
practices." Article 3 of The European Convention For The
Protection Of Animals Kept For Farming Purposes requires
that animals be housed and provided with food, water, and
care in an manner which is appropriate to their physiological
and ethological needs, taking the species into consideration. 7
Article 4 forbids restricting freedom of movement so as to
cause the animal unnecessary suffering or injury, taking spe-
82. Id. at 74-75. The further recommendations of the House of Commons Agri-
cultural Committee in 1981 have similarly remained uncodified. See Mason, supra
note 3, at 104.
83. See House of Commons, supra note 3, at 37; P. Singer, supra note 1, at 135.
See also Albright, Animal Welfare and Animal Rights, Nat'l Forum, Winter 1986, at
34, 35. ("To my knowledge, no one has been prosecuted for violation of these
codes.").
84. Mason, supra note 3, at 104.
85. Mason, supra note 3, at 104-05; J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note 1, at 138;
Comment, supra note 3, at 448; Note, supra note 3, at 421.
86. Harrison, Animals, supra note 3, at 71-72; J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note
1, at 138-39; Comment, supra note 3, at 448.
87. Leavitt & Halverson, supra note 44, at xxiii-xxvii. See also M. Fox, supra
note 3, at 215-16.
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cies into account.8 8 Recently, the Convention published a
draft proposal that would establish minimum standards con-
cerning layer hens.89
Nothing resembling these tentative steps have found
their way into the positive or common law of the fifty states
or the federal government of the United States. There is no
law akin to the simple policy enunciated in Article 9 of the
United Declaration of the Rights of Animals: "Where animals
are used in the food industry they shall be reared, trans-
ported, caged, and killed without the infliction of suffering"2 °
Such laws should be enacted not only for the sake of the ani-
mals, but for the sake of justice.91
C. Difficulties in Invoking Civil Process on Behalf of
Animals
While the criminal process fails, as a practical matter, to
protect the welfare of animals, the civil process is often held,
in theory, to be out of bounds. One reason is the overly-strict
application of the doctrine of "standing." Enshrined in both
the United States Constitution,92 and in the general common
law of most states,93 standing generally requires a plaintiff to
88. Leavitt & Halverson, supra note 44, at xxiii - xxiv.
89. Mason, supra note 3, at 104.
90. Note, supra note 3, at 414-15 n.259. See the specific recommendations for
allocations of space set forth in Webster, The Economics of Farm Animal Welfare, 3
Int'l J. Stud. Animal Problems 301 (Oct.-Dec. 1982).
91. Tribe, supra note 59, at 1348 ("[w]ho can fail to admit that the homocentric
logic of self-interest leads finally not to human satisfaction but to the loss of
humanity?").
We are degrading animals in our day by methods of reproduction and rearing
we are now employing. De-beaked hens, cooped-up calves fed on antibiotics,
and our growing denial of the personal association to our domesticated ani-
mals, which is their right if we domesticate them, constitutes a degradation
not only of animals, but of ourselves.
F. Darling, Wilderness and Plenty 80 (1970) quoted in S. Clark, The Moral Status of
Animals 28 (1977). George Bernard Shaw made a similar point when, speaking of
animal experimentation, he labelled it "a social evil because if it advances human
knowledge, it does so at the expense of human character." The Extended Circle: A
Dictionary of Human Thought 324-25 (Jon-Wynne Tyson ed. 1985) (quoting G.B.
Shaw from the Preface of Doctor's Dilemma (19-)).
92. U.S. Const., art. III.
93. But see Boryszenski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581, 372
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"show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct
of the defendant." 4 Thus, one may not assert the rights of
third parties.9 5
This permits sufficient access to the courts if one assumes
that only competent human beings can suffer injury, pain, or
loss. However, since animals "are uniquely incapable of de-
fending their own interests in court,"'" and the human beings
who seek to defend the animals' interests are often unable to
N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1975). The court of appeals ruled that suits would be permitted
where the failure to accord "standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable
barrier to any judicial scrunity of legislative action." Id. See also Salorio v. Glaser, 82
N.J. 482, 414 A.2d 943 (1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 804 (1980); Stocks v. City of
Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981) (both of which held that the
states were not bound by the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the
United States Constitution); McDonald, Creating A Private Cause of Action Against
Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 426-31 (1986).
94. Valley Forge Christian College v. American United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)). This injury may be economic, esthetic, or environmental (Si-
erra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)) and may be quite small (Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections , 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ($1.50 poll tax); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204-08 (1961) (a fraction of a vote)).
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has sometimes but not always re-
quired the alleged injury be traceable to the challenged action. Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978). That the relief sought
will likely redress the claimed injury (Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-39 (1976)) and that the interest sought to be protected is within
the zone of interests intended (Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp., 397 U.S. 150, 1 (1970)).
95. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474.
The United States Supreme Court has occassionally tacked on so-called "pruden-
tial" rules of standing, such as: (1) courts should seek to avoid deciding questions of
broad social import where no individual would be indicated (Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979)), (2) courts should seek to limit access to
federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim, (id.), (3)
courts should seek to evaluate the plaintiff's alleged personal stake to determine if it
is strong enough to assume the concrete adversiness sufficient to sharpen the presen-
tation of the issues, (Baker, 369 U.S. at 186), and (4) courts should require the plain-
tiff to differentiate his or her inquiry from that of the public (Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
736-41.). But see Havens Realty Corp. v. Colemen, 455 U.S. 363, 372- 79 (1982),
where the court stated that it lacked authority to create prudential barriers to suits
brought under Article III and should require the plaintiff to differentiate its injuries
from the public's injury.
96. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1977).
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show a direct injury to themselves, the true interests of ani-
mals will remain unrepresented in perpetuity."7 "Must our law
be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we
render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the
traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be
entirely adequate for new issues?"a8
Through the traditional standing doctrine, the courts
make "at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to
whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have
direct stake in the outcome." 99 However, when those who have
the direct stake are incompetent, as animals are, it is an ex-
tension of the cruelty that these animals have already suffered
to close the courts to their interests because of that incompe-
tence. One solution would be to expand the notion of guardi-
anship to permit human beings to act on behalf of farm ani-
mals in a manner analogous to the way in which guardians
currently act on behalf of incompetent human beings.100
97. Id. See also Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd
mem. 419 U.S. 806 (1975). The court held that the plaintiffs' allegation of injury to
moral and aesthetic values was sufficient to sustain standing, in a case where the
animals were likely the true intended beneficiaries. The court stated that:
plaintiffs allege that the [Humane Slaugter] Act [7 U.S.C. 1901, et. seq.] con-
tains a religious exception making it impossible as a practical matter to be
certain of purchasing meat from animals slaughtered by a process that they
consider humane and consistent with the policy of the United States as de-
clared in section 1 of the Act. Plaintiffs contend that this uncertainty causes
injury to their moral principles and aesthetic sensibilities. These allegations
are substantially comparable to the allegations of environmental injury in
United States v. S.C.R.A.P., [412 U.S. 669 (1973)] supra, where the court
sustained standing of plaintiffs.
Id. But see Jones v. Beame, 56 A.D.2d 778, 779, 392 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (1977), aff'd
on other grounds, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 308 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). There,
the court held that the plaintiffs, both natural persons and animal rights organiza-
tions, had no standing to request a declaratory judgment and injunction against the
city concerning the manner in which it was operating its zoos, because this would
inject the court into public management issues. However, the court said that the
plaintiffs had standing to seek enforcement of the state anti-cruelty statute.
98. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755-56 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
99. Id. at 740.
100. Id. at 750 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Cohen, Some Preliminary
Thoughts On Permitting Animals To Sue In Contract and Tort, 4 Int'l J. Stud.
Animal Problems 284, 285 (1983); McCarthy, The Changing Concept of Animals as
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Presently, one is required to translate an animal injury
into an injury of a human being. 101 However, one who utilizes
this tactic to improve the short-term welfare of farm animals
may run the ultimate risk of being counterproductive, for
[bly couching his claim in terms of human self-inter-
est-by articulating ... goals wholly in terms of human
needs and preferences-he may be helping to legitimate a
system of discourse which so structures human thought
and feelings as to erode, over the long run, the very sense
of obligation which provided the initial impetus for his
own positive efforts.102
The problem of standing has been confronted by persons
who defend the interests of such natural or environmental en-
tities, as rivers and wilderness areas.10 ' Yet, the standing
problem confronting farm animals is greater, for they are al-
ready privately owned;10 4 a human being already has "stand-
Property, 3 Int'l J. Stud. Animal Problems 295, 298 (1982); Galvin, supra note 2, at
248; Stone, supra note 40, at 464-73; Tischler, Rights For Nonhuman Animals: A
Guardianship Model For Dogs and Cats, 14 San Diego L. Rev. 484, 500-06 (1977);
Note, Use of Animals in Medical Research: The Need for Governmental Regulation,
24 Wayne L. Rev. 1733, 1749-50 (1978); Comment, supra note 44, at 277-81.
101. Tribe, supra note 59, at 1332; Stone, supra note 40, at 490. In a recent case
it was held that a humane society with a statutory charge to prevent and prosecute
animal cruelty and statutory authorization to present complaints before any tribunals
for violations of laws relating to or affecting the prevention of cruelty to animals had
standing to press a civil complaint against departments of the United States govern-
ment. Humane Soc'y of Rochester & Monroe County v. Lyng, 633 F.Supp. 480, 482,
485 (W.D.N.Y. 1986). The courts have specifically recognized standing for animal pro-
tective societies in similar cases. Id. at 485; Comm. for Humane Legislation v. Rich-
ardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
One untried method of obtaining standing would be for a plaintiff animal rights
or welfare organization to allege that the defendant's actions towards animals frus-
trate the plaintiff's activities. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 372-79.
102. Tribe, supra note 59, at 1330-31. Perhaps the best way to accommodate
both long and short-term animal interests is to adopt a "standing" strategy of raising
the animal's interest alongside the human interest, while seeking to nudge the court
towards an understanding of who is suffering the true injuries.
103. See Stone, supra note 40, at 450. See generally Tribe, supra note 59.
104. D. Favre & M. Loring, supra note 23, at 22-67. This problem could be fur-
ther complicated should the Congress allow our courts to hold that chimeric animals,
like microorganisms, are subject to patent. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980). The patent and trademark office recently announced it will consider patents
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ing" to raise an animal's injury in court. But the interest of
the owner in a farm animal is economic. The individual
animal's welfare may be congruent with the owner's economic
interest, it may be irrelevant, or it may be opposed. 0 5 The
anamolous legal situation created is that the only person with
the standing to sue on the animal's behalf as plaintiff is likely
to be that person who is inflicting the injury upon the animal
and who should therefore be the defendant. Another practical
consequence of, and difficulty with, leaving the protection of
farm animals almost solely to criminal law is that even if a
private citizen attempting to halt a practice surmounts the
obstacle of legal standing, the matter may be dismissed upon
the traditional equitable ground that the court will not enjoin
a criminal act.106 An example of this is Animal Legal Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp.107 There the plaintiff sought,
not under the state criminal anti-cruelty statute,0 8 but pursu-
from any animal other than man. J. Rifkin, Of Private Property, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26,
1987, at 2F; Playing God? We've Done it for Centuries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1987, at
2F.
105. Tribe, supra note 59, at 1331. In Humane Soc'y of Rochester, 633 F. Supp.
at 485, a dairy farmer was granted standing to challenge a United States Department
of Agriculture rule that mandated the hot face branding of dairy cattle as a require-
ment for acceptance into the federal Dairy Termination Program because to do so
would expose him to the risk of a criminal prosecution for animal cruelty under a
state statute. In Int'l Primate Protection League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, No.
86-1508 slip op. at 12-13 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1986), the court held that neither long-
standing interests in the subject monkeys or in the preservation and encouragement
of humane treatment of animals generally stated an article III injury. Yet the plain-
tiffs were the only parties unalloyedly interested in the monkey's welfare. One major
defendant had performed medical experiments upon monkeys that involved severing
the monkeys nerves had been convicted of cruelty to animals. This conviction was
ultimately reversed on the ground that the Maryland animal cruelty statute did not
apply to federally funded research programs. Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d
819 (1983). The other major defendant, the National Institute of Health, had funded
the project. Such a holding is ironic because the major reason for the doctrine of
standing, is the fear of inadequate legal representation because of the plaintiffs in-
sufficient interest in winning. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Imple-
ment Workers of Am. v. Brock, 106 S. Ct. 2523, 2536 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. Comment, supra note 44, at 229-30.
107. Animal Legal Defense Fund of Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626
F.Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1986). appeal filed.
108. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 77 (West Supp. 1984).
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ant to the Massuchusetts Consumer Protection Act, 09 to en-
join an unfair or deceptive act or practice.110 The plaintiff ar-
gued that1 "[c]onsumers have a right to know that veal sold
to them comes from cruelly mistreated calves; [the producer's]
failure to give consumers that information, not the cruel
treatment itself, is the unfair and deceptive trade prac-
tice. . ." 2However, the court looked not to the statute in-
voked but to the practical effect of granting the requested in-
junction. "An ALDF [Animal Legal Defense Fund] victory in
this action would have an unmistakeable effect: to enforce by
means of an injunction obtained in a private lawsuit, a crimi-
nal statute enforceable only by public prosecutors....,,-
D. Lack of Consumer Information
Factory-farming is not necessary to meet human nutri-
tional needs. At the heart of factory-farming beats a remarka-
bly inefficient agricultural system, one that results in a monu-
mental waste of soil, water, and fossil fuels. 1' It has been
aptly termed "a protein system in reverse,"11 5 whereby vast
amounts of such vegetable proteins as corn, oats, barley, soy-
beans, and sorghum are grown, then fed to factory-farmed an-
imals who produce five to fifteen percent of the same amount
of animal protein. " 6 If the object of a rational system of agri-
cultural is to feed a people cheaply and nutritiously, factory-
farming falls short.
If factory-farming is unnecessary to meet human nutri-
109. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 1-11 (West Supp. 1984).
110. Id. §§ 2, 9.
111. Provimi, 626 F. Supp. at 280.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 281.
114. F. Lappe, Diet for a Small Plant 74-83 (1982). "The number one factor in
elimination of Latin America's tropical forests is cattle raising." N. Myers, The Pri-
mary Source, Tropical Forests and Our Future 127 (1984). This vast potential reser-
voir of food, medicines, fuel, and industrial products, which regulates our climate and
environment in ways we both know and do not know (Id. at 189-293.) is rapidly suc-
cumbing to "the 'hamburgerization' of the forests." Id. at 142.
115. F. Lappe, supra note 114, at 70.
116. J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note 1, at 116; P. Singer, supra note 1, at 170.
This is not true when farm animals graze upon non-arable land.
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tional needs, wastes natural resources, despoils the environ-
ment, results in the sale of animal products that are deleteri-
ous to the health of the humans who consume them, and
causes cruel suffering to the animals emmeshed within by it,
why does it continue and what justifies its existence and ap-
parent legal sanction? One likely answer is that the consumer
does not know this and, in fact, is likely to believe the oppo-
site to be true.
The products of factory-farming are multifarious. The
shelves of grocery stores and the menus of restaurants are sat-
urated with factory-farmed meat and animal products.117
Their very pervasiveness anchors them to the modern land-
scape as firmly as the stores and restaurants in which they are
offered. Such inundation carries with it its own acceptance,
often uncritically embraced. Consumers rarely have heard of
the factory-farm and understand little of biotechnology.
In general we are ignorant of the abuse of living creatures
that lies behind the food we eat. Our purchase is the cul-
mination of a long process, of which all but the end prod-
uct is delicately screened from our eyes .... There is no
reason to associate [a neat plastic] package with a living,
breathing, walking, suffering animal.11
Factory farmers sometimes heap scorn upon urban dwellers
who criticize them for their methods and claim that the
urbanites are ignorant of animal husbandry. 119 This may well
117. A multibillion dollar animal by-products industry turns such waste products
as hooves, hair, hides, horns, blood, and bones into such things as glue, toothbrushes,
camera film, paint brushes, cosmetics, and detergents. Robeznieks, Hidden Animal
Products, 5 The Animals' Agenda 4, 10-11 (Dec. 1985).
118. P. Singer, supra note 1, at 92-93.
119. Even nonurbanites may not wholly sympathize. Larry Benolt, author of
How to Bag the Biggest Deer of Your Life, was recently quoted:
"People ask me how I can kill such a beautiful animal", and I say "Have you
ever seen a slaughterhouse and watched them kill cows and pigs, mass-
slaughter chickens? God put animals on earth to feed man. Domesticated
animals can be easily killed, but once they were wild. Some of us still like the
wild ones, that's all."
Chamberlin, Woods and Shore, Boston Globe, Dec. 31, 1985, at 41 , col. 1.
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be true.120 However, the factory-farmers' livelihood may be
predicated on the ignorance they deride, for if enough city
dwellers learn what is really happening on the farm, the in-
dustry could be shaken. A public opinion poll in England,
whose populace is traditionally viewed as more informed on
issues concerning animal welfare than is that of the United
States, showed a large majority in favor of abolishing or se-
verely restricting factory-farming. 121  American consumers
need the opportunity to learn the facts and to differentiate
among those meats and meat products that come from the
factory-farm and those that do not.
Probably the most effective media for conveyance of con-
sumer information are the package and package inserts. How-
ever, the Federal Meat Inspection Act 22 forbids the states
from requiring meat producers to inform the consumer either.
of the manner in which the factory-farmed animal is raised or
of the many health implications of eating such meat or animal
products. Enacted because Congress found that "[m]eat and
meat food products are important source of the Nation's total
supply of food,"'2 3 and "to protect the health and welfare of
consumers,""'2 the Federal Meat Inspection Act has been used
repeatedly to frustrate attempts to convey truthful informa-
120. A national survey sponsored by the Interior Department to learn the extent
of the knowledge of Americans concerning animals and wildlife conservation found
that slightly less than half believed that veal was a lamb. Kellert & Berry, Knowl-
edge, Affection and Basic Attitudes Towards Animals in Society, in American Atti-
tudes, Knowledge and Behaviors Toward Wildlife and Natural Habitats 18 (1980).
Only twenty-six percent knew that a manatee was not an insect. Id. at 13. Thirty-
seven percent did not know that all adult birds have feathers. Id. at 17. Forty percent
knew that the impala, muskrat, iguana, and killer whale were not all mammals Id. at
20. The authors concluded that "[flor the most part, Americans appear to possess an
extremely limited understanding of animals." Id. at 11.
121. See Clear Mandate to Abolish Factory Farming, 4 Intl. J. Stud. Animal
Problems 273, 273-74 (1983).
A 1985 public opinion poll conducted for the Frankfurt (West Germany) Zoologi-
cal Society found that eighty-two percent of the respondents were totally opposed to
the use of battery cages for hens, fourteen percent were partly opposed, and seventy-
six percent were willing to pay extra money for eggs not produced in them. German
Poll Against Batteries, 82 Agscene 9 (Mar. 1986).
122. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
123. Id. § 602.
124. Id.
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tion to the nation's consumers. This has been accomplished
through its express pre-emption clause, in which Congress
sacrificed consumer information on the altar of a national uni-
formity that informs the consumer of almost nothing of conse-
quence. 12 5 Attempts to provide the consumer with the infor-
mation needed to distinguish between foods
that contain low cholesterol cheese alternatives or regular
cheese, 2 ' to warn that raw pork must be heated to a tempera-
ture of not less than one hundred forty degrees to prevent
trichinosis,'27 and to warn of the dangers of antibiotic-resis-
tant bacteria,' 28 have been held pre-empted by the Federal
Meat Inspection Act.'29 In addition, state and local laws that
require truthful, acurate, and relevant information on product
labels also continue to be pre-empted by the Act.1 30 However,
the Act's pre-emption clause arguably violates' 3 ' the first
amendment. 32 If it is so held, the states would be free to or-
125. Id. § 678 ("[marketing, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in
addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by
any State or Territory to the District of Columbia . . .").
126. Grocery Mfr. of Am. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1985).
127. Meat Trade Inst., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 37 A.D.2d 456, 326 N.Y.S.2d 683
(1971) (the specific provision of the New York City Health Code is found in Meat
Trade Inst., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 66 Misc. 2d 1037, 1037, 323 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (1971),
which was reversed by the Appellate Division).
128. Provimi, 626 F. Supp. at 281.
129. Similar problems have ocurred in the area of laboratory animal experimen-
tation. See Alternatives to Animal Use, supra note 24, at 310-13. Conversely, an at-
tempt failed to require the Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to his power under 21
U.S.C. § 621, to mandate product labels that warned consumers that meat contained
salmonella and other bacteria and could cause food poisioning if handled incorrectly.
American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
130. Meat producers have sought and received permission from the United
States Department of Agriculture under the Federal Meat Inspection Act to label
their products as derived from animals that were not fed antibiotics.
131. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1982).
132. The first amendment may be violated to the extent that the pre-emption
clause of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678, forbids either a meat
producer, supplier, or seller from voluntarily including accurate, informative, and rel-
evant product information on its packaging label or a state or local government, pur-
suant to their normal police powers that allow governments to protect the public
health, welfare, or morality of its citizens from requiring such information to be
placed on such a label. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1985). Pre-emption has been sucessfully invoked when the
Supremacy Clause and 21 U.S.C. § 678 were wielded offensively. See supra notes 119-
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der meat producers to place upon the packaging, labels, or on
20. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 520, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925
(1977). Pre-emption has been invoked as an affirmative defense by meat-promoting or
producing organizations to strike at state or local legislation that arguably required
more informative packaging or labeling information than did the Federal Meat In-
spection Act.
In Jones, 430 U.S. at 525, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he first inquiry is
whether Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, U.S. Const., art. I,
Sec. 8, has prohibited state regulation of the particular aspects of commerce involved
in this case." But the first inquiry should be whether the Federal Government has the
constitutional capability of pre-empting the subject area of the statute. See, e.g.,
Winkler v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 193 Colo. 170, 175, 564 P.2d 107, 111 (1977).
The subject area must involve the Congressional exercise of either a constitutionally
enumerated power, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1969); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,
405 (1819), or of the "Neccessary and Proper Clause," U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, in
order to effectuate an enumerated power, though the means of effectuation be
unenumerated. See Alternatives to Animal Use, supra note 24, at 311-12; Engdahl,
Some Observations on State and Federal Control of Natural Resources, 15 Hous. L.
Rev. 1201, 1206 (1978); Engdahl, Pre-emptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 51 (1973); Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: Cali-
fornia's Nuclear Law as a Pre-emption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. Rev. 3, 27 (1979);
Note, Federal Pre-emption: Protect Endangered Species, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 261,
265-68 (1977). Congressional power, even that bestowed by the Commerce Clause,
necessarily excludes the exercise of power in a subject area expressly forbidden to
Congress, as the abridgement of first amendment rights to freedom of speech. For
instance, Congress could not, pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause, pass
a valid statute that regulated the political content of newspapers that either traveled
in interstate commerce or affected it.
The pre-emption clause, § 678, of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, however, for-
bids a state from requiring a meat producer, supplier, or seller from providing the
consumer with accurate and relevant product information, for instance, that the meat
animal was fed subtherapeutic dosages of antibiotics or was the product of factory-
farming. "Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state ac-
tion may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a pre-
cisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest." Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980). A corporation is clearly
such a "private person". First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771
(1978), reh'g. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978). There can be no doubt that speech is being
restricted here. There is serious doubt that this restriction is in the service of a "com-
pelling state interest," or that such an across-the-board silencing is "a precisely
drawn means" of serving such an interest. This is especially true since the statement
of findings concerning the Federal Meat Inspection Act reveals concern over possible
"injury to consumers" and a desire that the "the health and welfare of consumers be
protected," 21 U.S.C. § 602 (1982), areas in which that the states may also wish to
address themselves.
It is likely that the proposed information conveyed on a meat label will not be
characterized as "commercial speech." It is neither "an expression related solely to
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accompanying inserts, such further information as might be
important to a substantial number of potential consumers."' 3
Such information might be as simple, yet compelling, as the
facts that the meat was or was not the product of factory-
farming or that the animal was or was not fed continuous sub-
therapeutic dosages of antibiotics.""
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience ...." nor "speech proposing a
commercial transaction." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 106 S.
Ct. 903, 907-08, reh'g denied 106 S. Ct. 1667 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the
utility's newsletter, inserted with the monthly bill, was entitled to "full protection of
the First Amendment. See also In Re Nat'l Serv. Corp., 742 F.2d 859, 861-62 (5th Cir.
1984) (the court held that a corporation's billboards were not "solicitation[s] for the
sale or purchase of a product or service" and that it was not going to profit financially
from the message"). It will then be protected by the full force of the first amendment.
But even if proposed information, such as the facts of the feeding of subtherapeutic
dosages of antibiotics to the meat animal or the fact that the animal was factory-
farmed, is held to be "commercial speech", it would likely still be protected. See
Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 561-71.
The states and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes
an illegal transaction. Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and
does not concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only in the
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that
directly advance that interest.
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2275 (1985) (citations omit-
ted). First amendment protections of commercial speech are "justified by the value to
consumers of the information such speech provides." Id. at 2282. "[Rjestrictions in-
volving commercial speech that is not itself deceptive [must] be narrowly crafted to
serve the State's purposes." Id. at 2278.
If the proposed information is true, accurate, and relevant, its blanket prohibi-
tion by § 678 of the Federal Meat Inspection Act may therefore violate the first
amendment, whether the information is seen as noncommercial or commercial speech.
Section 678 of the Federal Meat Inspection Act therefore has no pre-emptive capabil-
ity and the asserted defense of pre-emption must fall, no matter what the intention of
Congress was in passing the statute.
133. One court acknowledged that "[a] virtually unlimited variety of information
might cause large numbers of consumers to modify their behavior." Community Nu-
trition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Many might disfavor, for instance, meat from animals anesthetised with car-
bon dioxide gas prior to being slaughtered, cf. 9 C.F.R. sec. 313.5 (1984); meat
from cattle afflicted with tapeworm cysts, cf. 9 C.F.R. sec. 311.23; or liver
sausage that contains lips, snouts, and ears, cf. 9 C.F.R. secs. 319.182(b),
301.2(tt), 301.2(uu).
Id.
134. A 1985 public opinion poll conducted for the Frankfurt (West German) Zoo-
logical Society found that seventy-six percent of the respondents were in favor of a
33
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
While the Provimi court stated that its decision was
rested solely on pre-emption grounds, it made clear that it
was not minimizing the serious risk that resistant bacteria,
immune to antibiotic medicines, could grow in drug-fed ani-
mals and spread to human beings where they could cause dis-
eases that could not be treated with normally effective
antibiotics.135
The ALDF could well be concerned about the federal gov-
ernment's ability and eagerness to oversee and regulate
the animal drug and livestock industries. Such concern is
justified... [But] [t]he FMIA and the FDCA evince Con-
gress's intent to control the use of antibiotics in animal
feed and this complaint cannot get around that fact. 36
Consumers might also learn the history of the meat animals
they are considering purchasing through enactment of state
laws that would require grocers and restauranteurs to post an
informative sign,13 7 or to place required information directly
on the menu. 138
But Americans are told that meat and animal products
are necessary for good physiological1 ' and menta 1 40 health.
Factory-farmers and others seeking markets for their animal
products find it profitable to perpetuate the myth of the pas-
ture and the barnyard as a marketing device."1 Meat-eating is
law by which factory-farmed eggs would be so marked. German Poll Against Batter-
ies, 82 Agscene 9 (Mar. 1986).
135. Provimi, 626 F. Supp. at 286 n.5.
136. Id.
137. Grocery Mfrs., 755 F.2d at 993. See also Meat Trade Inst. v. Ball, 424 F.
Supp. 758 (W.D. Mich. 1976). Informational signs were not intended to be included
within the scope of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601. In dictum the
court stated that it would consider such a sign ban to be a violation of the first
amendment. Id. at 767-70.
138. Grocery Mfrs., 755 F.2d at 993.
139. J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note 1, at 114-19.
140. Morris, Animal Foods for Human Needs in Animal Agriculture, The Biol-
ogy of Domestic Aniamls and Their Use by Man 31 (H. Cole & M. Ronning eds. 1974)
("[floods of animal origin generally have a greater capacity to satisfy 'appetite' and to
produce a hedonistic experience than foods of plant origin, even though they may
have comparable nutritional value.").
141. D. Giehl, supra note 2, at 180-88; F. Lappe, supra note 114, at 90-91.
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associated with material success. 4" Powerful industry boards
and the individual companies create demand for the products
of the factory-farming system through advertising, sometimes
with explicit federal governmental sanction. 143 Most of the
meat consuming population is non-rural and if they do not
know the species of the animal that they eat, they have no
glimmer of that animals' ethological needs or the conditions in
which the animal was raised. They are not going to receive
this information through the mechanism of the Beef Research
and Information Act,' 4 ' the Egg Research and Consumer In-
formation Act 45 or the Diary Research and Promotion Act,"46
each of which has the purpose of increasing industry profits.1
47
It is probable that states with heavy dependence on the
products of factory- farming will simply refuse to regulate fac-
tory farming practices. In 1985, the Indiana legislature
amended its anti-cruelty statute to exclude "acceptable farm
management practices."14 " But the consumers of factory-
farmed animals and their products, and producers of them do
not live in the same states and it is the citizens of the urban
consuming states who will ultimately determine the fate of
the factory-farming and genetic engineering of farm
animals."4
142. J. Blakely & D. Bade, supra note 59, at 2 ("[a] rising standard of living in
the United States has carried beef as a status symbol on the coattails of success"); D.
Giehl, supra note 2, at 180-88.
143. J. Mason & P. Singer, supra note 1, at 106-07.
The Beef Research and Information Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911 (Supp. III 1985))
and the Egg Research and Consumer Information Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2718 (1982))
declare that beef and eggs, respectively, are "basic, natural foods in the diet. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2701; 7 U.S.C. § 2901. The Dairy Research and Promotion Act of 1983 declares
dairy products to be "basic foods that are a valuable part of the human diet." 7
U.S.C. § 4501(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
144. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911 (Supp. III 1985).
145. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2718 (1982).
146. 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4538 (Supp. III 1985).
147. These three statutes authorize the establishment of procedures for "promo-
tion designed to strengthen" each "industry's position in the market place, and main-
tain and expand domestic and foreign markets and uses" each industry's product. 7
U.S.C. § 2701; 7 U.S.C. § 2901; 7 U.S.C. § 4503(b).
148. 1985 Ind. Acts ch. 326.
149. "[W]e recommend that [the Minister] .. . encourage retailers as well as
caterers to describe the origin of their products in a way which will encourage the
1986]
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III. Conclusion
The problem of the unjust use of farm animals is large,
growing, historical, institutionalized, governmentally en-
couraged, and fundamentally unregulated at either the state
or federal level. Farm animals are treated essentially as raw
materials. Their ethological needs and direct interests are ne-
glected to the extent that their needs are not as congruent
with higher productivity and profit. Their interests are pri-
marily protected, if at all, through archaic state anti-cruelty
statutes that were not passed in contemplation of the factory-
farm or genetic engineering. They are of little use and little
used. Farm animals remain helpless, because they are legally
incompetent, and assertion of their interests are barred by the
traditional legal doctrine of "standing," a concept that is
sound only when applied to competent human beings. Though
factory-farming and biotechnological techniques massively vi-
olate the moral rights of farm animals, they have no remedy.
American consumers know little of the needs of farm ani-
mals, little of the health risks of eating them, and almost
nothing of modern factory-farming and biotechnological tech-
niques. The federal government neither adequately protects
nor informs consumers about the animal products they eat or
of the health hazards of eating them. Instead it aids industry
boards that exist solely to sell animal products. It also pro-
vides tax incentives to factory-farmers. 150 Because Congress
has pre-empted the field, states have been unable to enact ad-
choice.. ." between factory-farmed and humanely raised veal calves. House of Com-
mons, supra note 3, at 24. English surveys have revealed that consumers are prepared
to pay higher prices for animal products produced by less intensive methods. J.
Serpell, supra note 4, at 155.
150. The Internal Revenue Code encourages factory-farming. Under the Code,
structures built for factory-farming are entitled to a investment tax credit, § 48(p),
while other farm structures are treated as normal capital expenditures. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-12 T.D. 7198 July 13, 1972.
Not only should there be no tax incentives for cruel methods of animal hus-
bandry, but there should be disincentives that encourage humane methods of farm
animal husbandry. "[W]e. .. invite the Minister ... to... try, on the one hand to
avoid measures which will encourage the trend to undesirable methods and, on the
other, to see whether. incentives can be devised . . . to encourage more humane
ones .. " House of Commons, supra note 3, at 17.
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ditional laws that require meat producers to provide consum-
ers with accurate and relevant product information. Consum-
ers should have the right to know in order to make informed
decisions.
Anglo-American justice has reformed or abolished the un-
regulated wholesale exploitation of the helpless by the strong;
women, children, blacks, and the disabled have all tasted its
sweet fruits. "[Fliat justicia, ruat coelumtet," 15 ' spoke Lord
Mansfield, upon deciding that a Virginia slave was a free man
on English soil. 152 The factory-farming and genetic engineer-
ing of farm animals, based as it is upon their unregulated in-
stitutionalized exploitation in a manner that inherently and
unnecessarily infringes their basic needs and concerns, is un-
just. Because it is unjust it should be abolished.
151. "Let justice be done whatever be the consequence." The Case of James
Sommersett, a Negro, on a Habeus Corpus, 20 Howell's State Trials 1, 79 (1771-
1772) [herewithin cited as James Sommersett].
152. James Sommersett, supra note 151, at 1.
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